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 Psychoanalysis occupies somewhat of a strange position within contemporary socio-
political theory.  On one hand, psychoanalysis has long had an influence within the social 
sciences and social theory outside of the clinic.  Although Freud’s early writings were concerned 
with the dreams and various neuroses of his patients, in his later years he turned to applying his 
model of the psyche to society writ large.  Within socio-political theory more specifically, 
psychoanalytically-inspired critical theory stretches back to at least the Frankfurt School 
tradition.  Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm’s arguments about the psychical trade-offs within 
modern society, among others, illustrated that, at least for some scholars, the insights of 
psychoanalysis could be fruitfully taken outside of the clinic to understand broader societal 
dynamics.  Habermas’s (1971) early work reconstructing psychoanalysis as an emancipatory 
guide continued these trajectories.  An upshot of many of these seminal analyses was the 
argument that an understanding of the workings of the human psyche could make sense of 
otherwise puzzling tendencies surrounding issues of self and society, and freedom and 
repression.  In contrast to more behavioral and objectivist approaches to political analysis, 
psychoanalytic socio-political theory offered an alternative that merged the social and the 
psychological in a way that not only highlighted problems, but offered ways of thinking about 
critical social practices aimed at negotiating or overcoming such challenges and realizing 
emancipatory visions. 
 On the other hand, psychoanalysis in many ways remains a fairly marginal approach within 
socio-political theory.  Psychoanalysis aims to lay bare what are often uncomfortable truths.  As 
Wolfenstein (1996: 707) noted, psychoanalysis “reminds us of our immaturity, brings us back to 
painful experiences we would prefer to disregard, asks us to tolerate the very anxieties and our 
theoretical discourses have been structured to avoid.”  Perhaps because of this, or because of the 
often ambiguous epistemological status of psychoanalysis (Wolfenstein 1996: 707), or perhaps 
because psychoanalytic forays into social and political issues are often judged from the position 
of dominant rationalist and objectivist approaches of political science, psychoanalytically-
inspired research often has trouble getting a hearing.  To be sure, such research has sometimes 
tended to work against its own advocacy.  The notion that phenomena at the “collective” level of 
society could be reduced by explanation via “individual” dynamics has often led to suspicion of 
applying psychoanalytic theory to society, and rightly so.1   Moreover, the idea that collective 
phenomena can be explained by reference to a collective psychical “unconscious” or “essence” is 
a contention that is now rightly avoided (Stavrakakis 1999, 1; Wrong 1994).2  Yet, even when 
contemporary psychoanalytic-inspired research works to avoid such pitfalls, it is often viewed 
with extra scrutiny compared to more conventional approaches, particularly when conflated with 
the reductionist tendencies of earlier efforts. 
 Despite such challenges, psychoanalytic approaches have long been applied to the 
interpretation of political texts,3 and have recently experienced somewhat of a resurgence during 
the past decade or so.  Particularly in political theory, a variety of psychoanalytically inspired 
frameworks have recently proliferated which address in new ways a host of issues of traditional 
theoretical concern.  For example, the so-called “Essex School” of discourse theory (Howarth, 
Stavrakakis, and Norval 2000) frequently deploys conceptual tools from Jacques Lacan’s social-
                                                
1 See, for example, Reich (1970).   
2 Carl Jung’s (1991) work is probably the exemplar here. 
3 See, for example, the books reviewed in Wolfenstein (1996). 
psychoanalytical approach.  Ernesto Laclau was the founder of the “Ideology and Discourse” 
program at Essex, and his most recent work is often explicitly Lacanian psychoanalytical (Laclau 
2005), as is other work influenced by him (Critchley and Marchart 2004). Slavoj Žižek (1989, 
1997) has long drawn upon Lacanian theory to analyze politics, pop culture, religion, and other 
issues.  Moreover, similar deployments of Lacanian theory can be found in recent international 
relations research (Arfi 2010; Edkins 2003; Epstein 2013; Solomon 2012, 2013).  Of course, this 
focus on Lacanian-inspired research should not be taken as the only psychoanalytic-inspired 
approach to socio-political analysis – Freudian (Schuett 2010), Kleinian (Gallagher 2010) and 
other traditions have also been recently drawn upon as well.  Yet, research inspired by Lacan 
seems to have gained steam and influence in recent years.4   
 Following this trend, this chapter offers an overview of the contribution of Lacan’s 
approach to those interested in issues of interpretation in political theory.  Specifically, it engages 
in an explanation and discussion of what Lacan termed the “four discourses,” a series of 
configurations that concisely draw together many of the key concepts of Lacan’s theoretical 
corpus.  In Lacan’s view, discourse is constitutive of social life – of our identities, our collective 
understandings, and our subjectivities.  In his approach, there are four basic elements that are 
common to all discursive contexts.  These elements, when brought together in different 
configurations, constitute subjectivity in specific ways through the manner in which they channel 
desire.  Desire, in this view, is the driving force behind subjectivity, and is that which helps to 
attach subjects to their articulated positions within discourse, but also that which aims at 
achieving a “whole” or “complete” subject.  Desire here is not strictly sexual, but is ontological – 
                                                
4 Of course, such work is not without its critics.  See Engelken-Jorge (2010) and Robinson 
(2004) for critiques, and Thomassen (2004) for a rejoinder. 
desire constitutes the subject.  The subject continually lacks that which it believes will make it 
“whole,” and so desire is directly related to the subject’s originary lack, but desire is also what 
binds the subject to the social field.  Consequently, discourse shapes a range of emotional, 
textual, and intersubjective processes.  In this sense, exploring how these different registers of 
subjectivity are produced, maintained, and shift within different discursive structures holds 
promise for researchers in political theory seeking frameworks to analyze the ways in which 
texts produce effects in audiences through the dynamics of desire.  This is precisely how 
Lacanian theory offers a theoretical advantage over earlier Freudian theory.  By rejecting the 
explicit biological drives of Freudian frameworks, and avoiding the notion of a Jungian 
“collective unconscious” that motivates collective behavior, Lacan’s framework circumvents 
many of the theoretical pitfalls involved in using psychoanalytic concepts in socio-political 
analysis.  By emphasizing the interweaving of discourse and desire in subject formation, Lacan 
offers a theoretical model that suggests an apt empirical method for textual analysis which 
forgoes the need to resort to biology or collective essences.  Introducing the element of desire 
into how texts and discourses construct subjectivity in different ways thus holds promise for 
gaining purchase into the powerful effects that texts can produce in their audiences. 
 The chapter proceeds in three main sections.  First, it offers an overview of Lacan’s theory 
of discourse, specifically his model of the four discourses.  Each of the four basic elements of 
discourse are detailed – the “split” subject, the “missing” object a, master signifiers, and system 
of knowledge – as are their intricate relations to each other, and they are briefly placed within 
Lacan’s broader theory of the subject.  Each of these four basic elements are then discussed 
within the context of the four basic kinds of discourse which Lacan theorizes: the Master’s 
discourse, the University discourse, the Hysteric’s discourse, and the Analyst’s discourse.  Not 
only do each of the four elements “take up” different positions in each discursive structure, but 
each structure is itself part of an overall configuration relating to the others.  In the second 
section, the chapter deploys the framework to analyze the dynamics of desire and subject 
formation in Hobbes’s Leviathan.  In doing so, the section will aim to illustrate what a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic approach brings to the textual analysis of a classic work of political theory.  The 
conclusion will draw together the main arguments and analytic themes of a Lacanian approach 
and how they help us to understand textual effects that might remain unseen when viewed 
through other analytical lenses. 
 
Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses 
  Lacan offers a novel approach to discourse theory and interpretation that moves beyond 
classical notions of “finding” “the meaning” of a text.  Instead, Lacan argues that discourse is 
more usefully understood as a social bond that ties together agents in a relational manner.5  In 
                                                
5 Lacan never offers a single definition of “discourse,” but instead offers a wide-ranging 
understanding of it throughout his corpus.  He views the “practice of language” as that which 
“dominates” society (2007: 207).  Discourse functions as symbolic systems of difference, yet 
discourse can also be non-verbal; there can be “discourse without speech” because a “discourse 
can clearly subsist without words” (2007: 12-13).  Yet discourse “subsists in certain fundamental 
relations which would literally not be able to be maintained without language” (2007: 13).  That 
is, language structures all symbolic and intersubjective relations, verbal and non-verbal.  
“Through the instrument of language a number of stable relations are established, inside which 
something that is much larger and goes much further than actual utterances can, of course, be 
inscribed” (2007: 13).  Implied here are the aspects of subjectivity, such as desire, that are bound 
this sense, through a Lacanian psychoanalytic lens there is no “meaning” to uncover.  Rather, 
discourses are to be analyzed as configurations that draw together the role of signification and 
desire through which subjects are produced through language.  These configurations are depicted 
as structures constituted by four discursive positions (Agent, Other, Product, Truth), which can 
be occupied by four elements: master signifiers (denoted by the symbol S1), the system of 
signification, or the “knowledge” of the discourse (S2), the split subject ($), and the “missing” 
object a (a).  Each of these key components of Lacan’s theory of discourse and subject formation 
are discussed below.  These are constituent elements of any discourse, and consequently play a 
role in each of the four basic kinds of discourse described by Lacan.  To begin, Lacan posits an 
Agent who articulates and “sends” a discourse and an Other who hears or “receives” it 
(Verhaeghe 1995; Žižek 1998). 
Agent    →    Other 
In hearing or receiving a message from the Agent, an Other is “hailed” (represented by the 
arrow →) as a subject of the discourse.  The Agent’s message to the Other and the Agent’s 
position itself is underpinned by some Truth, yet this is repressed or ignored by the Agent 
(represented by the bar −). 
Agent     →    Other 
       Truth             
 
At the same time, the Agent’s discourse aims at achieving some effect in the Other.  This 
is represented in the Product position on the receiver side of the configuration. 
                                                                                                                                                       
up with language yet are not coterminous with it.  As Bracher (1994: 107) explains, “these 
‘fundamental relations’ are of several different orders: intrasubjective or psychological relations, 
intersubjective or social relations, and relations with the nonhuman world.”   
Agent    →     Other 
  Truth          Product 
 
Each of the positions above the bar (Agent, Other) represents the most overt, evident, or 
active aspects of a discourse.  The positions below the bar (Truth, Product) represent the more 
latent or implicit elements at work in the discourse.  The positions on the left (Agent, Truth) 
represent the factors at work in the Agent, while the factors on the right (Other, Product) 
represent the elements active in the receiving Other.   
The relations between the four elements (master signifiers S1, knowledge S2, split 
subjectivity $, and the object a) are dependent upon the positions they obtain within each 
discourse structure.  Lacan argued that these four basic kinds of discourse are rooted in basic 
structures of subjectivity.  Put differently, the four kinds of discourse discussed here can be 
understood as different types of social bonds that constitute subjects through different kinds of 
intersubjectivity.  The Master’s discourse is the discourse of power, governing, and/or 
commanding.  The Hysteric’s discourse is the discourse of questioning and protesting.  The 
University discourse is the discourse of educating or indoctrinating.  The Analyst’s discourse is 
the discourse of analyzing, transformation, and revolution (Bracher 1993: 53).6    
Master’s Discourse         Hysteric’s Discourse 
 
 
      S1  →  S2                                                  $  →   S1 
      $           a                a         S2 
 
                                                
6 For Lacan these four discourses and their constituent elements represent fundamental aspects of 
subjectivity.  Late in his career he introduced a fifth, the Capitalist’s discourse, which is identical 
to the Master’s except for the switched positions of the master signifier S1 and the split subject $.  
However, he did not develop this discourse to the extent he did the initial four.   
 
 
University Discourse          Analyst’s Discourse 
 
       
      S2 →   a                                                  a   → $ 
      S1        $                                               S2      S1 
 
Before discussing the particular dynamics and social effects that each of these discourses 
produce, let us first explain each of the constituent elements (S1, S2, $, a) in turn.  Each element 
constitutes a key aspect of Lacan’s theory of subject formation through the entanglement of 
discourse and desire.  As such, understanding each element and its intimate relations to the 
others will help to unravel not only how desire plays a key role in the formation of subjectivity, 
but also will later point to the different kinds of social effects that each of these discourses may 
have on receiving subjects.   
Master signifiers (S1) 
 As Lacan argued that subjectivity is intimately bound up with signification, master 
signifiers take on a key role.  Put simply, master signifiers are those terms that the subject is 
deeply invested in, and are those that are felt by the subject to express its “essence” (even if such 
a thing is ultimately illusory).  Bracher (1993: 24-5) argues that master signifiers are “one of the 
main elements that give discourse purchase on a subject,” and that “master signifiers are able to 
exert such force in messages because of the role they play in structuring the subject – specifically 
in giving the subject a sense of identity and direction.”  More specifically, master signifiers play 
a role in drawing together the linguistic and desirous/emotional dimensions of subjectivity. 
 Lacan argued, along with many other contemporaneous thinkers, that identity and 
subjectivity have no “natural” or pre-given basis.  Rather, subjectivity is produced through 
language, and it these linguistically constructed “senses of self” that form the subject.  We can 
observe the role of language in child development when we deploy signifiers to position children 
into social relationships within what Lacan calls the Symbolic order.7  When we encourage or 
discourage children with discourses like “you’re a big girl/boy,” children often eagerly invest in 
seeing themselves as such, and work to embody those traits that they perceive as characteristics 
of being a “big girl” or a “big boy.”  Later in life, we turn to and invest in other signifiers that we 
feel represents us – “father,” “mother,” “professor,” and so on.  Similar investments obtain in 
politics.  Societies generate time-honored signifiers with which most members of the community 
identify.  “Democracy,” “justice,” “freedom,” and “revolution” are prominent examples of 
political master signifiers.  Similarly, “weapons of mass destruction/WMD” arguably functioned 
as a master signifier in American political discourse in the 2002-2003 run-up to the Iraq War 
(Oren and Solomon 2013; Oren and Solomon 2014).  Such terms often become the central 
discursive anchors around which much political debate coheres because of the structuring role 
they play in (collective) subjectivity.  Audiences become political subjects through their 
investment in the images that such signifiers offer.  The image of one who identifies with 
“democracy,” “freedom” and so on is perceived by the subject to be valued by the wider society, 
                                                
7 For Lacan the Symbolic order comprises the register of language and intersubjective relations, 
and encompasses what we commonly call culture and society.  More specifically, it is the realm 
of intersubjective communication that is structured by linguistic differences that have no 
foundation outside of language.  Evans (1996: 203) offers a similar definition: “Since the most 
basic form of exchange is communication itself, and since the concepts of [symbolic] ‘law’ and 
of ‘structure’ are unthinkable without language, the symbolic is essentially a linguistic 
dimension.  Any aspect of the psychoanalytic experience which has a linguistic structure thus 
pertains to the symbolic order.”   
and so s/he aims to embody those characteristics that s/she sees as appropriate to one who is 
“democratic” and who promotes “freedom.”  Yet, these terms themselves have no “natural” or 
“intrinsic” meaning.  Despite their adherents’ beliefs to the contrary, there is no natural referent 
“out there” that “freedom” hooks into.  In this sense, even though identities are ultimately 
without foundation, meaningful constructions of these terms help to temporarily “pin down” 
such signifiers as central points around which political debate obtains.   
 Desire plays the crucial role in tying subjects to their beloved significations, and the very 
instability of master signifiers is crucial to their position as discursive anchors.  Put differently, 
their lack of stable or “full” meaning is key to their role in structuring subjectivity.  In technical 
terms, master signifiers’ lack of “full” meaning elicits subject’s desires to identify and invest in 
the “promise” of “full” subjectivity it is seen to offer.  Take the role of “freedom” in 
contemporary American political discourses.  On one hand, “freedom” can mean many things.  
The various political forces within American politics all attempt to define “freedom” on their 
own terms, and its meaning is therefore continually contested within political discourse, and its 
history helps to explain its centrality to contemporary debates (Solomon 2015).  Despite its 
contestation among different political forces, “freedom” remains unquestioned as a political 
value, and this is precisely the role of the master signifier.  Subjects accept it without question 
for its own sake, even if its meaning is not able to be pinned down.  Yet, in another sense, the 
term’s lack of fixed meaning leaves a gap between “the meaning” of the term and subjects’ 
identifications with it.  No interpellation process can ever “fully” hail a person as a subject (as 
there is always a “remainder” of subjectivity that is not captured by representation), and it is this 
failure that produces the very possibility of identification (Žižek 1989: 122).  This lack of full 
meaning allows the subject to “fill in” or invest this gap with its own subjectivity.  Desire is the 
spark here.  No signifier’s meaning is ever fixed, and no hailing discourse can represent or 
interpellate the subject fully, and desire to overcome, eradicate, negotiate, and alleviate lack (and 
its attendance anxieties and frustrations) is the driving force constituting identification processes.  
Thus, these dynamics between lack, “fullness,” desire, and signification interweave to produce 
the subject’s investments in instances of signification.   
Knowledge (S2) 
 The knowledge S2 of a discourse plays a supporting role to the master signifier S1.  
Although the term “knowledge” can have many different meanings (such as formal academic 
knowledge, intuitive knowledge, etc.), its specific sense here relates to its articulation through 
signifiers.  The system of knowledge or beliefs S2 that a discourse attempts to produce is a series 
or battery of signifiers that represent elements or concepts that underpin the dominant message of 
the master signifier.  As Alcorn (2002: 70), explains, “S2 is the collection of meaningful 
representations belonging to a culture or a person.  S2 is itself not truth but the collection of those 
things meaningful for a culture.  S1 is part of S2 because it is meaningful, but it is different from 
S2 because it is valued.”  While both S1 and S2 are signifiers, master signifiers S1 play the 
dominant role of carrying, or imposing, the preferred meaning of the discourse.  In this sense, 
master signifiers are more valued than the system of knowledge underpinning it, yet knowledge 
plays a key role in providing the wider system of beliefs within which the master signifier draws 
its power.  It is their mutual relationship in a discourse that ties them together.  It is “something 
that links one signifier, S1, to another signifier, S2, in a relationship of reason” (Lacan 2007: 30).   
 Like master signifiers, systems of knowledge/belief8 are key in the production of a 
subject’s identity.  The master signifiers and supporting range of signifiers that represent a 
subject’s values and culture constitute the discursive context within which a meaningful sense of 
self is produced.  Returning to the earlier example, “freedom” in the American context is 
typically supported by a range of associated signifiers which help to partly “fill in” its meaning.  
On the left, “freedom” is often group together with “equality,” “social justice,” and “fairness.”  
Strung together in a discourse, these signifiers help to construct a message of “liberalism” or 
“progressivism.”  In contrast, on the right “freedom” is often more associated with the “free 
market,” “liberty,” or as an antonym to “big government.”  The system of knowledge/belief 
within which the subject is caught up helps to not only constitute identity, but perhaps more 
importantly works to channel the subject’s desire in different ways.  It is these links among the 
range of master signifiers S1 and systems of knowledge/belief S2 that help to constitute the 
subject’s sense of itself, both conscious and not; “the foundation of what is known, of what is 
quietly articulated as the little master, as the ego . . . resides in such a relation as this and, 
precisely, insofar as it is not known” (Lacan 2007: 30).  Consequently, not only does S2 help to 
constitute both conscious and unconscious knowledge, but also situates the body “within a 
knowledge, that is, an articulation of signifiers, a network of relationships (associations and 
oppositions) with other sensations, perceptions, and affective states” (Bracher 1993: 110).   
Split Subject ($) 
                                                
8 Conventional understandings of knowledge and belief as distinct notions are largely irrelevant 
here.  Lacan is concerned with how both must be articulated through signifiers within a discourse 
to be socially meaningful and effective. 
 As is evident by now, Lacan departs significantly from the unified, self-knowing, rational 
“self” of mainstream political analysis and political psychological approaches.  For Lacan, the 
subject is not located in the ego – the self-conscious aspect of subjectivity – but is rather de-
centered off of the traditional foundations of the ego.  The mistake of psychology, Lacan (2006: 
705) argues, “consists in taking the very phenomenon of consciousness to be unitary, speaking of 
the same consciousness…”  The split or division of the subject refers back to the notions of 
fullness and lack, and those aspects of subjectivity that escape representation in discourse.  The 
subject adopts master signifiers as its own in order to gain symbolic representation and to 
achieve a sense of stability, yet the master signifier never fully represents or exhausts 
subjectivity as such.  There is always a gap between representation through a signifier and what 
gets left out of representation.  This gap is simultaneously unbridgeable yet constitutive of 
subjectivity as such – the subject needs representation through signifiers to engage in symbolic 
relations even though representation fails, yet it is this very failure that sparks the desire for it.  
Lack sparks desire for subjectivity, yet since no signifier can fully deliver on the “promise” of 
subjectivity desire is ongoing and is continually displaced to other objects.  In our discourse of 
“freedom” example, individuals may identify as subjects of the discourse, yet the hailing process 
would never be fully complete.  The discourse of “freedom” will always lack a certain ineffable 
something (the object a, discussed below) which in turn will spark the subject’s desire to 
continue to identify with it.  This split – or lack – of subjectivity is the condition of possibility for 
continued identification.  This has far-reaching effects for the subject, as it prompts the 
movement of desire that continually produces subject formation, and ensures that the subject is 
never self-identical, so to speak.  As Fink (1995: 45) argues, the subject is split “between an 
ineluctably false sense of self and the automatic functioning of language (the signifying chain) in 
the unconscious.”  The self-conscious ego never completely coincides with the subject-as-lack 
because of this split.  As Lacan (2007: 103) put it, there “where I am thinking I do not recognize 
myself, I am not, this is the unconscious.  There where I am, it is all too clear that I am lost.”  In 
other words, the self-conscious thinking ego, or “I,” never quite coincides with the subject as 
such, since it is split between consciousness and the linguistically-structured unconscious.   
Object a (a) 
 There is a key aspect of the subject’s constitutive split to which Lacan pays particular 
analytical attention.  For him, the question of why the subject keeps pursuing the promise of 
representation that always nevertheless fails is key.  What precisely does desire keep driving at 
even in the face of continual frustration?  Lacan gave a name to this “object,” objet a, or object a.  
Strictly speaking, though, this is not an “object” in the conventional sense.  Rather, it is “that part 
of the subject’s being that is simultaneously left out of and produced by the identity established 
for the subject in the S1 → S2 articulation (Bracher 1993: 114).  The “excess” of subjectivity is 
both produced by and escapes representation in discourse.  Object a “designates precisely what 
presents itself as the most opaque in the effects of discourse . . . yet is essential.  It is a question 
of an effect of discourse that produces a reject” (Lacan 2007: 42-3).  Signification produces the 
possibility of lack, and it is this sense of lacking (manifested in the subject’s frustration, anxiety, 
and so on) that sparks the subject to seek that which appears to promise the alleviation of lack.  
The subject searches that which would appear to eradicate lack and promises a “full” sense of 
self.  Yet, there is no such object that will ultimately provide the grounding that the subject 
seeks.  The perceived-to-be-missing object is nothing other than the leftover of the signification 
process itself.  Signification does not capture the “whole” of subjectivity, in turn producing lack 
and desire, yet the subject’s belief that something is “lost” is nothing but the retroactive 
presupposition that something must have caused the subject’s desire.  Indeed, this positing of 
some object that will alleviate lack is the subject’s way of avoiding confronting the anxiety 
associated with its intrinsic groundlessness.  In this sense, object a is the cause of the subject’s 
desire, although it is not an empirically-existing “object,” and does not directly appear in 
discourse.  “We know nothing about this object, except that it is the cause of desire, that is to say 
that strictly speaking it manifests itself as a want-to-be” (Lacan 2007: 151).  Numerous objects 
can temporarily fill this role – such as money – yet lack always resurfaces, and the search for 
another object continues.  As Žižek (1997: 178) argues, object a “is simultaneously the pure lack, 
the void around which the desire turns, and, as such, causes the desire, and the imaginary 
element which conceals this void, renders it invisible by filling it out.”  The subject continually 
constructs “fantasy” narratives for why the promised “fullness” is never forthcoming. 
 Prominent master signifiers are often seen as partial manifestations of object a.  In politics, 
terms like “democracy,” “justice,” and so on can function as object a through their ambiguity.  
Since “justice” has no intrinsic meaning, it can have multiple meanings without being fixed to a 
single one.  There is no “essence” behind “justice,” even if its adherents feel and believe that 
there is.  Yet, it is this lack of fixed meaning which allows – or, invites – subjects to identify with 
it by “filling in” its lack with their own perceived meaning.  In other words, it is the lack in 
“justice” that draws in subjects to represent themselves through it.  The same process is at work 
in our “freedom” example.  The subject’s continued identification with a discourse touting 
“freedom” as that which will bring what seems to be missing actually depends upon “freedom” 
not delivering on this promise.  Since there is no “essence” to “freedom,” subjectivity will 
continue to be lacking since the master signifier that defines it is itself lacking.  In this sense, 
“freedom” is often seen by its adherents as the embodiment of the elusive object a, or that which 
will “solve” the problems in our politics.  As Žižek (1989: 158) argues, the “self-referential 
movement of the signifier is not that of a closed circle, but an elliptical movement around a 
certain void.  And the objet petit a, as the original lost object which coincides with its own loss, 
is precisely the embodiment of this void.”  In this sense, the concepts that we often feel as having 
the richest meaning of a discourse – “justice,” “freedom” – points to subjects’ own “filling in” of 
its lack, since it has no natural meaning that enriches it beyond the meanings attributed to it 
through identification practices.   
Master’s discourse 
S1  →  S2 
         $          a 
 It is helpful to begin with the Master’s discourse, since it is the discourse structure in which 
the elements seem to most intuitively coincide with their position.  Here, the master signifier S1, 
in the Agent position, functions as the anchoring signifier for the barrage of secondary signifiers 
of the system of knowledge S2 (in the Other position) within which the master signifier draws its 
power.  These are the two most overt aspects of the discourse, as they are above the bar – 
separating them from the latent elements.  The master signifier and system of knowledge 
constitute the manifest discursive context within which the subject is formed.  Below the bar on 
the Agent’s side, in the position of latent Truth, is the divided subject $, and below the bar of the 
Other is object a in the position of Product.  The latent or “hidden” Truth of the Agent is that 
s/he is a divided subject.  Although the master signifier – and the Agent who deeply identifies 
with it – aims to present itself as fully present, autonomous, and unified, it is in fact a lacking 
subject just as any other.  It is still produced by the desire sparked by lack and its attendant 
anxieties, even if it purports that it is not.  The master ultimately lacks foundation just as every 
other signifier and subject.  For the Other, the “missing” object a is below the bar.  This is 
because the Other’s desire (for the object) is, in effect, denied in the Master’s discourse.  The 
Master offers a discourse to the Other that promises the delivery of something that would make 
the Other “whole.”  The master signifier, as discussed above, signifies this promise.  However, 
the Master’s significations and discourse never fully deliver on the promised “wholeness.”  The 
effect is that the Other “keeps hanging on” to the Master’s discourse without ever obtaining that 
which it seeks – the object a which is denied to it.   
 An example of the Master’s discourse that Lacan offers is science.  We are used to thinking 
of science as precisely that method that protects against prejudice, political influence, and so on.  
However, Lacan argues that, as with all discourses, science is often characterized by the power 
of the Master (Lacan 2007: 149).  Even as science purports to be guided by empirical research of 
the real world, it in effect draws in more of that world into the sphere of master signifiers around 
which scientific discourse is structured (Bracher 1994: 118).  Similar examples are found in 
politics.  We see the Master’s discourse at work when a discourse – anchored by a master 
signifier – becomes an organizing principle for nearly all spheres of society.  The “free market” 
in contemporary American political discourse may be seen as a Master’s discourse – many in 
power attempt to expose all aspects of life to the dominating power of the “free market” S1, and 
this is supported by a range of other secondary signifiers S2 (“competition,” “fairness”).  Yet, the 
discourse of markets deny the latent Truth that it is not the “free” system that it purports to be 
($), but is rather a system that creates and sustains economic, social, and political inequalities, 
and thus denies its adherents the fantasies of wealth (a) that it nevertheless promises.    
Hysteric’s discourse 
$  →   S1 
a         S2 
 
 In the Hysteric’s discourse, each of the constituent elements shift one position clockwise.  
Here, the divided subject $ is now in the Agent position, and the master signifier, previously the 
guiding element of the Master’s discourse, is in the position of Other.  The “missing” object a 
occupies the latent position of Truth (on the Agent’s side, under the bar), while knowledge S2 is 
in the Product of the discourse.  The Hysteric’s discourse is characterized by questioning and 
protesting.  As the split subject $ takes the force of Agency, this does not mean that a self-
unified, autonomous subject drives the discourse, but rather the subject’s “split” itself is the 
driving force.  The subject is dissatisfied with its position and interrogates (→) the dominant 
master signifiers S1 with questions.  In a sense, the Hysteric is sparked by its lack (its anxieties 
and frustrations) to continually ask the master signifier for answers.  However, even though the 
master signifier acts as the organizing principle for the society’s dominant discourses, it is 
ultimately empty and devoid of fixed or uncontested content.  It is thus unable to offer the 
Hysteric the foundational answer that it seeks – the master has no ultimate foundation to offer.  
Instead, the master continually offers a stream of knowledge S2 to try and placate the Hysteric, 
but to no avail.  The subject remains ignorant that what drives its anxieties is not this or that 
problem, but instead its intrinsic groundlessness ($).  The subject constructs a fantasy that 
attempts to ground its existence and to alleviate its frustrations, which may temporarily succeed, 
but lack always re-arises, as fantasies are always structured around master signifiers of some 
type (Lacan 2007: 94).     
 As Alcorn (2002: 86) explains, the Hysteric’s discourse “performs an enormously 
important social function: It reveals the lack in other discourses.”  Hysterics point out where the 
Master offers no satisfactory answers and what the Master leaves out.  As a result, “the subject 
himself, the hysteric, is alienated from the master signifier as he whom this signifier divides” 
(Lacan 2007: 94).  The Hysteric’s discourse is thus a valuable counter to the claims of the Master 
– by constantly interrogating the anchoring position of the master signifier, the Hysteric’s 
discourse calls into question the dominant discourses structured by such signifiers.  However, 
because, “hysterical subjects are not recognized as subjects in the terms offered by the discourse 
of the master or the university (discussed below), their speech often does not make sense” 
(Alcorn 2002: 86).  Consequently, Hysteric’s discourses are often seen as lacking “legitimacy” 
as grounds upon which discourse can commence.  
Analyst’s discourse 
a   →  $ 
S2       S1 
 
 In the Analyst’s discourse each of the elements again shift one position clockwise.  Now, 
object a occupies the position of Agent, the split subject $ takes the position of Other, knowledge 
S2 in the latent Truth position, and the master signifier S1 in the product position.  If the Master’s 
discourse is characterized by commanding, and the Hysteric’s discourse by questioning, the 
Analyst’s discourse is perhaps best characterized as transforming, and potentially revolutionary.  
The key reason for this is the a in the Agent position – that lack itself becomes a force of agency 
in this discourse.  What does this mean?  For Lacan, the Analyst’s discourse holds the best 
chance for the subject changing its relationship to lack and desire.  The subject’s lack – its 
anxieties, frustrations, and disillusionments – takes center stage here, meaning that the subject 
actively engages with its lack.  Put differently, the subject actively confronts its lack – the very 
act that the Master’s and University (discussed below) discourses aim to avoid.  However, a 
master signifier S1 is in the Product position here.  This means that the subject’s confrontation 
with lack ultimately produces another Master’s discourse.  This may seem paradoxical at first – 
how can a supposedly “revolutionary” discourse resort back to that which it attempts to counter?  
The key here is that this new master signifier is produced by the subject itself, rather than being 
imposed from outside (Bracher 1994: 124).  All subjects must be represented by some master 
signifier if they are to be part of the Symbolic order.  However, if the subject can produce this 
new anchoring signifier him/herself, then this will likely go some way towards alleviating the 
alienating aspects of a signifier imposed from outside and adopted unreflectively.  In this sense, 
there is a continual cycling among the different discourses, including the Analyst’s and the 
Master’s discourses, rather than a linear progression.  “This displacement [among the discourses] 
never ceases,” Lacan (2007: 147) argues, and is “the very condition of analytic discourse.”  The 
transforming or revolutionary potential arises from its orientation that is opposed to the certainty 
and pretense to foundations of the Master’s discourse.  The Analyst’s discourse is opposed to 
“mastery” (Lacan 2007: 69).  In actively negotiating the sources of its frustrations, the subject 
comes to see that its desire is not for this ideal or that particular image, but is rather ultimately 
oriented around its lack of foundations.  By prompting the subject to face his/her alienation with 
the current master signifier, the Analyst’s discourse configures desire in a manner that stimulates 
the subject’s own production of a new master signifier.   
University discourse 
        S2 →   a 
S1       $ 
 Finally, in the University discourse, each of the elements shifts clockwise one position 
from the Analyst’s discourse.  Here, knowledge S2 occupies the Agent position, object a the 
Other, the master signifier the latent Truth, and the split subject as the Product.  The most notable 
feature of the University discourse is the place of knowledge S2, which is the most overt aspect 
of the discourse.  Knowledge interpellates the Other as a, the Product of which is a subject $ split 
between the knowledge it adopts and that which escapes that system of representation.  Although 
knowledge has the force of agency here, the University and the Master’s discourse share a key 
commonality – they are both, in effect, controlled by master signifiers.  Much of the power of the 
University discourse stems precisely from the place of “objective” knowledge – knowledge 
which is seen as unbiased, and apart from the subjectivity of whoever articulates it.  Whereas the 
Master derives its power from the sheer force of authority, the University promotes itself as a 
discourse of objective knowledge.  Yet, Lacan argues that every discourse is supported by the 
force of master signifiers (here, in the Truth position).  The discourse of science, for example, 
promotes itself as free of perspective, but Lacan sees science as driven by the unquestioned 
master signifier of more “knowledge” for its own sake, and critical questions about the value of 
this knowledge are typically “quashed” (Lacan 2007: 105).  As Zupančič (2006: 168) notes, the 
most political aspect of this discourse is precisely that “it disavows its performative dimension; it 
always presents, for example, that which leads to a political decision, founded on power, as a 
simple insight into the factual state of things (or public opinion polls, objective reports, and so 
on).”  This discourse is at work when subjects feel that “‘the facts compel me,’ logical compels 
me,’ or ‘rules require the following’” (Alcorn 2002: 83). 
 It is important to remember that these configurations aim at concisely conceptualizing the 
complex relationships between subjectivity, signification, and desire.  As such, they provide a 
useful framework to understand and analyze the role of desire in the construction of subjects 
through discourse.  As there are different relationships that can obtain between desire and 
signification, there are a variety of subjects that different discourses produce through these 
various positions.  Consequently, introducing desire into discourse analysis can aid in more 
comprehensively grasping the kinds of subjects that texts can produce and the political effects 
therein. 
 How can this framework be put to use to understand the dynamics of desire and 
signification at work in texts?  The following sections use Lacan’s four discourses as a lens 
through which to pinpoint the role of desire and discourse at work in a text of classic political 
theory.  Hobbes’s Leviathan is a text that works to position its readers in particular stances vis-à-
vis lack and desire.  In this sense, Hobbes’s text is perhaps exemplary in its deployment of both 
the Hysteric’s discourse – in positioning fear (or, lack) as the initial driving force of the 
discourse – then offering a quintessential Master’s discourse solution of the Leviathan. 
 
Discourse and Desire in Hobbes’s Leviathan 
 Hobbes’s Leviathan offers pertinent example of how discourse shapes desire for 
subjectivity in particular directions, facilitating certain types of subjects.  Leviathan is a rich text 
that also demonstrates how the four discourses often work in conjunction.  Rarely is one 
discourse found in “pure” form, or found totally divorced from the other discourses that it can 
often shade into.  The key sections of Hobbes’s text show how the reader is positioned in shifting 
ways via shifting discursive structures through Hobbes’s argument.  As analyzed here, Leviathan 
works to position its receiving subjects through three key discursive moves.  It initially hails the 
subject with a University discourse of “objective” knowledge about the material nature of reality, 
then positions the subject’s lack (here, fear in/of the state of nature) front and center in a 
Hysteric’s discourse, and subsequently offers a Master’s discourse as a promise and solution – in 
the form of the Leviathan itself.   
“Matter” and “Motion” as Ontology/System of Knowledge 
 Hobbes’s thoroughly materialist ontology famously forms the basis for his politics.  Matter 
and motion form the foundation for the entire epistemological framework that follows.  
Hampsher-Monk (1992: 9) explains that for Hobbes, the “basis and origin of all human 
knowledge was sensation.  The basic and irreducible component of existence for Hobbes was 
moving matter.”  As put by Hobbes himself (1991: 15), “when a thing is in motion, it will 
eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it.”  Life itself is “but a motion of Limbs” 
(1991: 9).  Indeed, reality is nothing but materiality (1991: 463).  Human perception is material 
experience impinging upon bodily “sense;” for “besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of 
thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion” (1991: 23).  This materiality is key for Hobbes’s 
view of human action, community, and political order.  He distinguishes between the two types 
of motion in humans, “vital” (natural processes of breathing, heartbeat, etc.) and “animal” or 
voluntary (1991: 37-8), yet they are closely related.  Voluntary motion can aim to preserve and 
maintain vital processes, but can also aspire to more social goals of honor and riches (1991:53).  
Of all of the numerous desires that characterize human life (1991: 70-1), the desire for survival is 
a general proposition regarding human behavior.  The continuation of motion is the ultimate 
cause of such self-seeking behavior, since without such motion or desire “is to be dead” (1991: 
54).  Consequently, Hobbes puts “for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and 
restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.  And the cause of this [is that] 
. . . he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the 
acquisition of more” (1991: 70). 
 The opening twelve chapters of Leviathan which lay out this ontological and 
epistemological scheme are presented by Hobbes as the new scientific study of human behavior.  
“Science” as defined by Hobbes is the search for consequences, as opposed to causes (1991: 35).  
As science depends upon the careful and proper defining of terms (Hobbes 1991: 28), the 
materialist foundation of human behavior is advanced as logically deduced from seemingly 
undisputed facts of existence.  Reason itself, for Hobbes (1991: 32), “is nothing but Reckoning 
(that is, Adding and Subtracting) of Consequences of general names agreed upon, for the 
marking and signifying of our thoughts.”  Material reality at base is matter and motion, our 
knowledge of it stems from the logical deductive linking of our significations with their 
consequences, which mirror links in material nature – this fundamental ontology is presented by 
Hobbes as neutral analysis of the nature of reality, based on logic and science, apart from 
political perspective.  Much of this presentation fits well with the logic of the University 
discourse. 
S2 →   a 
      S1        $ 
Materiality  →            a                      
         Order          “Scientific” Subject 
 
  The force of “objective” knowledge characterizes the University discourse in the position 
of Agent.  Lacan notes that the University discourse is a particularly modern discourse – with the 
rise of science and modernity, scientific knowledge, rather than religious or mystical knowledge, 
came to have power to define truth regimes.  Fink (1995: 132) argues that Lacan suggests “a sort 
of historical movement from the master’s discourse to the university discourse, the university 
discourse providing a sort of legitimation or rationalization of the master’s will” (see also Lacan 
2007: 104).  As a key text of modernity, much of Leviathan’s profound influence can perhaps be 
attributed to its early deployment of a University discourse, hailing its subjects with “scientific 
knowledge” rather than the sheer force of monarchical authority of a Master’s discourse.  In 
these opening chapters of Leviathan, Hobbes offers a barrage of signifiers that form the 
foundation of his system.  “Matter,” “motion,” “science” – these terms form the basis of his 
ontology or system of knowledge S2, and take the force of Agency driving the discourse at this 
point.  The object a, or the lack in the discourse, occupies the position of Other.  Although the 
object a is above the bar, this should not be taken to mean that it is somehow “visible” or overtly 
represented in the discourse.  It is the “lost” object of desire, or lack.  Correspondingly, the split 
subject is the Product of the discourse.  Alcorn (2002: 83) explains that in the University 
discourse, “the reception of knowledge works precisely through the suppression of 
individualized feeling or desire.  In this discourse, the subject says ‘the facts compel me,’ ‘logic 
compels me,’ or, ‘the rules require the following.’”  “Logic compels me” seems to fit Hobbes’s 
discourse well here.  As a discourse based on the science of “matter,” “motion” and so on, it is 
seemingly articulated apart from Hobbes’s own subjectivity.   
 However, another crucial aspect of the University discourse is the position of the master 
signifier S1.  Recall that Lacan argues that although a discourse may present itself as “objective” 
or “based on the facts,” it nevertheless ultimately supports a master signifier, however latently.  
Although Hobbes’s discourse at this stage purports to offer scientific knowledge S2 apart from 
political perspective, it is ultimately made to serve what is dominant signifier of Leviathan: 
political order.  The receiving audience here is guided from prefatory discussion of the system of 
knowledge regarding “matter” and “motion” to the crucial discussion of the conditions under 
which humans come together to form a political community.   
The “State of Nature” as Induction of Fear/Anxiety 
 Hobbes progresses from the foundations of his system to the conditions for human 
collective association, which falls under his discussion of the “state of nature.”  Following from 
his scientific method, Hobbes views himself as logically deducing the state of pre-government 
humans from the characteristics he has asserted as natural to them.  All humans seek to satisfy 
their desires throughout their lives: “the object of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and 
for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire” (Hobbes 1991: 70).  
Power is any means through which humans secure these continual desires.  “The Power of a Man 
(to take it Universally), is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good” (1991: 62).  
The desire for power ceases only with death (1991: 70).  Moreover, as there is no “Summam 
Bonum” or “highest good” to which humans orient their actions – and given that notions of good 
and evil are subjective judgments of what we feel to be good or bad for us – it is ultimately the 
pursuit of desires and power to achieve those desires that drive behavior (1991: 70, 39).  As 
Sabine (1961: 463) explains, the “desire for security, the really fundamental need of human 
nature, is for all practical purposes inseparable from the desire for power, the present means of 
obtaining apparent future goods, because every degree of security requires to be still further 
secured.”  Yet, it is not the power-laden pursuit of desires alone that leads to the state of nature.  
Hobbes (1991: 87) notes that since the “difference between man, and man, is not so 
considerable” both in terms of physical strength and intellect, there is a kind of natural equity to 
humans.  The pursuit of desires amongst humans of natural equality will almost inevitably lead 
to conflict: 
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends.  And 
therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both 
enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End (which is principally their owne 
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one 
an other (Hobbes 1991: 87). 
 
In such a context, and during that time “men live without a common Power to keep them all in 
awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and as such a warre, as is of every man, 
against every man (1991: 88).  This, of course, makes “the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short” (1991: 89).  Thus, the war of all against all is not primarily caused by scarcity 
of resources, but from humans’ reasoning abilities.  Humans’ conflicting desires for the same 
objects leads to their calculations of potential social interactions rather than scarcity alone 
(Hampsher-Monk 1992: 25).   
 Guiding the reader (via a University discourse) from basic materials of reality (“matter” 
and “motion”) to the basic motivations of humans in their “naturall condition” (1991: 86), 
Hobbes arguably now positions the reader into a Hysteric’s discourse: 
$  →   S1 
          a         S2 
Fear  →   Order 
                  a          Science 
 Although Hobbes concedes that the “state of nature” is not accurate history (1991: 90), 
the dynamics he describes potentially push the subject into a position where his/her division is 
the driving force of the discourse at this point.  The fear and anxiety $ generated by the state of 
nature sparks the desire for a master signifier S1 that will bring order to the war of all against all.9  
The subject in such a context pursues a master signifier that will provide a foundation for the 
anxieties and fears that currently manifest themselves as the subject’s splitting, acting as the 
force of Agent here.  Ultimately, it is the subject’s lack of foundations (a) that drives his/her 
divisions and anxieties, even if in the short term the fear of violence and survival is immediate.  
Hobbes’s rhetoric here is quite illustrative, and points to the type of subject his discourse 
positions at this point in order to soon lead to the solution to the problem of order: 
In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; 
and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and 
                                                
9 Sokoloff (2001) argues that anxiety, rather than fear, is the key problem that concerns Hobbes 
with the state of nature. 
removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no 
account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all; continuall 
feare, and danger of violent death” (1991: 89).   
 
Hobbes paints a picture of the state of nature as so dire that one has essentially no choice but 
accept a politically drastic solution.  The subject’s fears and anxieties, in other words, take the 
prominent position of the discourse at this point.  The Leviathan, as the guarantor of order, 
produces a new system of knowledge S2 that secures the new order and provides the subject with 
some semblance of grounding, even if this is ultimately impossible (a).   
The “Leviathan” as a Master’s Solution 
 As the state of nature is so horrific, Hobbes puts as another general proposition that 
humans desire peace: “all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way or 
means of Peace” (1991: 111).  Consequently, Hobbes puts forward his first two natural laws.  
The first is that humans seek peace and that everyone should endeavor to obtain peace, but where 
this effort fails, there is no constraint on what one may do to defend themselves in order to 
survive (1991: 92).  Second, Hobbes argues that in order for peace to fully obtain, each must be 
willing to “lay down his right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other 
men, as he would allow other men against himself” (1991: 92).  Only by entering into a contract 
with all others in society may the safety of all be guaranteed.   
 The crucial dimension of the contract is that it must be instituted through power.  As the 
laws of nature (“as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing unto others, as wee 
would be done to”) are contrary to our “natural Passions,” the “terrour of some Power” is 
necessary for them to be observed (1991: 117).  Indeed, power is a necessary factor here, since 
“without the Sword, [covenants] are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (1991: 
117).  Without power, the political community cannot come into being and sovereignty cannot be 
instituted.  The nature of this contract for those who consent is, of course, absolute.  It is as if 
“every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my right of Governing my selfe, to 
this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and 
Authorise all his Actions in like manner” (1991: 120).  All, through their consent, transfer their 
own power over to single ruler or assembly.  “Hobbes’s idea,” Hampsher-Monk (1992: 40) 
explains, “is that the public persona of the citizen is concentrated in the sovereign so 
exhaustively and irrevocably that there is no political agency left for the individual to exercise 
and so no source of political conflict.”   
 Indeed, there is perhaps hardly a better example of the Master’s discourse: 
S1  →  S2 
         $          a 
Order  →  Materiality 
Fear              a 
 
The Sovereign becomes the foundation of political order, which is the very definition of the 
master signifier S1.  The master signifier offers the Hysterical subject what it was looking for – a 
foundation upon which to ground itself, and which to alleviate lack.  The foundational signifier – 
the signifier of order, in this case – is supplemented by a range of other signifiers S2 that form the 
system of knowledge within which the subject takes its place.  Indeed, as Hobbes contends, the 
Sovereign itself sets the meanings of words so that contracts and covenants are aptly carried out; 
“It belongeth therefore to him that hath Sovereign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of 
Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace; thereby to prevent Discord and Civill 
Warre” (1991: 125).  In this sense, the Leviathan is the literal embodiment of the master signifier 
founding the Symbolic order.  Yet, what is produced (in the position of Product) is not 
necessarily the security that the Sovereign promises.  Instead, lack itself (a) is (re)produced.  
Since no one can complain of an injury from the Sovereign since he himself is the author of 
Sovereign authority (Hobbes 1991: 124), the security promised by the Sovereign does not 
ultimately obtain as it is promised.   
Hobbes’s Discourse through Lacanian Lenses 
 What a “four discourses” reading of Leviathan offers is a glimpse of how desire works 
through discourse.  Desire is a key element of discourse, and is that which drives subjects to keep 
producing and identifying with discourse in order to obtain an ever-elusive sense of “fullness.”  
Perhaps at least part of Leviathan’s political effects can be attributed not solely to its logical 
strategy of argumentation, but rather to how it positions subjects in different discursive 
structures, thereby shifting them into varying positions with respect to desire.  As Alcorn (2002: 
97) argues, discourse is often “effective when it works on the desires that trigger particular 
meaning effects” (Alcorn 2002: 97).  The value-added of this Lacanian reading of Hobbes can be 
briefly compared and contrasted to Ernesto Laclau’s Lacanian-inspired reading of Leviathan.  
What the four discourses add is precisely this focus on how the discourse of the text may induce 
different political effects based on the different structures channeling desire.10   
 Laclau, in an essay exploring the role of empty signifiers in politics, uses Hobbes’s state of 
nature to demonstrate the organizing power of words within the politics of discursive hegemony: 
Let us consider the extreme situation of a radical disorganization of the social fabric.  In 
such conditions – which are not far away from Hobbes’s state of nature – people need an 
order, and the actual content of it becomes a secondary consideration.  ‘Order’ as such has 
no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually realized, but in 
a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an 
                                                
10 For recent Lacanian reading of Leviathan within the context of International Relations theory, 
see Epstein (2013). 
empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence.  In this sense, various political forces can 
compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the 
filling of that lack.  To hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function 
(Laclau 1996: 44). 
 
Laclau points out here the power of the discourse of Leviathan, rather than the persuasiveness of 
its logical argumentation.  “Order” as a signifier has no intrinsic meaning; rather, its meaning is 
only generated relationally via its difference to other signifiers in the symbolic system.  The 
“need” for a foundational signifier is primary argues Laclau, yet the content and actual 
organization of that order is secondary.  Yet, what Laclau neglects here is what this chapter tries 
to draw out.  That is, desire plays a key role in the “need” that Laclau asserts.  Unfolding this 
“need” is in fact necessary to more comprehensively understand the very political dynamics that 
Laclau wishes to elaborate.  “Need” is better understood as desire for “fullness” in the Lacanian 
sense.  As Leviathan progresses through its key stages of argumentation, its discourse channels 
desire in particular ways via specific discursive configurations.  In doing so, it produces desiring 
subjects as its political effects.  It is not only that the particular content of “order” is secondary to 
the institution of the founding signifier itself.  “Order” obtains the political power that it does 
because of the effects of desire driving the fantasy of stability and wholeness. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that incorporating the psychoanalytic notion of desire can be a 
fruitful step for more comprehensively understand the potential socio-political effects of texts 
and their interpretations.  A Lacanian method of interpretation that centers on desire does not 
attempt to “uncover” “the meaning” of a text, but rather views texts as discourses that produce 
social reality.  Such a method attempts to discern the intricate workings of desire and subject 
formation within texts.  For Lacan, different discursive structures (Master’s, Hysteric’s, 
Analyst’s, University) position the subject in relation to desire in various ways.  The different 
positions that desire can take in relation to subjectivity ($), master signifiers (S1), systems of 
knowledge/belief (S2), and lack (a) produce discursive configurations that can generate notable 
political effects. 
 This chapter is not, of course, the only Lacanian reading of Leviathan that is possible, and 
certainly not the only possible reading drawing upon psychoanalytic theory more broadly.  
However, this chapter is – like every text – a discourse, and as such positions an audience in 
particular ways.  In this sense, the discourse of this chapter approaches the Analyst’s discourse.  
a   →  $ 
S2       S1 
 
One of the aims of the chapter is to try and disturb existing notions of interpretation and to thus 
induce some uncertainty ($) in order to persuade scholars of political theory interested in issues 
of interpretation to begin to pay attention to the role of desire (S1) in interpretation.  In this sense, 
“desire” is perhaps the key master signifier underpinning this discourse.  Implicitly, the present 
author’s assumed knowledge (S2) of Lacanian theory has served as a latent “foundation” for this 
chapter’s discourse, even if this “foundation” is not really a foundation at all – as Lacan’s vast 
corpus is open to multiple interpretations, this multivocity is useful in stimulating new ways of 
understanding the multifaceted dynamics of historical texts such as Leviathan.   
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